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THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST: THE 
MUDDIED WATERS OF ROCKWEED 
MANAGEMENT IN MAINE 
 





Seaweeds, or more properly, intertidal macroalgae have never been easy 
to classify—by law or by science: they are not part of the animal kingdom, 
nor part of the plant kingdom (and scientific controversies about their 
phylogenetic placement abound), they are not completely on terra firma, 
nor completely submerged in ocean water. One such organism that exists 
at the space in between land and sea—the brown alga commonly known 
as Rockweed (Ascophyllum nodosum) presents an intriguing legal 
question with implications that extend far beyond the shoreline. Recently, 
in Ross v. Acadian Seaplants Ltd., the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
(Court) ruled that Rockweed located within the intertidal zone is the 
property of the adjacent upland property owner, and therefore the public 
cannot enter intertidal lands to harvest Rockweed as a matter of right—a 
right that has been preserved for the harvest of shellfish species, fish 
species, and bird species. The legal status of Rockweed is important to the 
scientists that study its ecological benefits, the harvesters that collect it for 
commercial purposes, the state agency concerned with its sustainable 
management as a marine resource, and the coastal landowners that assert 
that seaweed is their private property. This article explores the legal 
justification for—and practical resource management issues associated 
with—the Court’s decision to treat a marine organism such as Rockweed 
that derives its nutrients from ocean water and not through a root system 
as private property.  
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 Along the rocky shores of Maine, in that dynamic place 
where land meets sea and the tides ebb and flow, no one knew who 
owned the seaweed until recently. The legal status of Rockweed— 
the harvest of which is a growing industry in Maine—is important 
to the scientists that study its ecological benefits, the harvesters that 
collect it for commercial purposes, the state agency concerned with 
its sustainable management as a marine resource, and the coastal 
landowners that assert it as their private property. Algae have never 
been easy to classify—by law or by science—they are not quite part 
of the animal kingdom, nor the plant kingdom, not completely on 
terra firma, nor completely submerged under water. However, in 
Spring 2019, in Ross v. Acadian Seaplants Ltd., 206 A. 3d 283, 283-
296 (2019), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (Court) ruled that 
Rockweed located within the intertidal zone is the property of the 
adjacent upland owner, and therefore the public cannot harvest 
Rockweed as a matter of right—a right that has been preserved for 
the harvest of shellfish species, fish species, and bird species.5 This 
ruling strays from that norm, where states predominantly consider 
access to marine organisms as part of the public trust.6 For example, 
clams, mussels, fish, and the activities associated with their harvest 
(e.g., fishing, digging) are held in trust by the state of Maine for the 
people.7  
 With seaweed now private property, harvesters and scientists 
will look to coastal landowners to grant permission to access 
Rockweed, not the state. Landowners will decide if and how the 
                                            
5 Ross v. Acadian Seaplants Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 33, 206 A. 3d 283, 294. 
6 See John Duff & Cheryl Daigle, Public Shoreline Access in Maine: A Citizen’s 
Guide to Ocean and Coastal Law, 4 (2004) (discussing Maine’s public trust 
doctrine and how it protects the rights to harvest fish, shellfish, and other marine 
organisms); see also The Wildlife Society et al., The Public Trust Doctrine: 
Implicating for Wildlife Management and Conservation in the United States and 
Canada, TECH. REV. 10-01, 22 (2010) (discussing the application of the Public 
Trust Doctrine to wildlife, and providing North Carolina’s Public Trust 
protection of marine organisms as an example).  
7 State v. Lemar, 87 A.2d 886, 888 (Me. 1952); State v. Leavitt, 72 A. 875, 879 
(Me. 1909); see also Duff & Daigle, supra note 1.  
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Rockweed can be accessed based on their own individual interests 
(e.g., aesthetic, financial, and ecological). The management of 
Rockweed as a resource has shifted from a resource management 
policy, established at the state level and informed by scientific 
information, to a system of rights and access or denial based on 
individual property owner incentives. This marine organism that 
exists at the space in between land and sea presents an intriguing 
legal question with implications that go far beyond the shoreline. In 
Part II of this article, we provide a background on the Public Trust 
Doctrine. In Part III, we provide a background on Rockweed and its 
role in Maine’s coastal social-ecological ecosystem. In Parts IV and 
V, we consider the legal treatment of Rockweed under Maine law. 
In Part VI, we explore the practical implications of the Court’s 
decision for Rockweed’s future in Maine. Finally, in Part VII, we 
address the broader implications of the privatization of Rockweed.  
 
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND DETERMINATIONS 
REGARDING COMMON POOL RESOURCES AND PRIVATE GOODS IN THE 
MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
 
 The Public Trust Doctrine – a state level common law 
doctrine – holds that state-owned lands are held in public trust to the 
benefit of all citizens subject to certain usage rights. Under the 
doctrine, states have a trust responsibility to manage such lands for 
the public benefit. In particular, the Public Trust Doctrine 
undergirds states’ responsibility to manage publicly accessible 
common pool resources for the public good.8 A strong Public Trust 
Doctrine in a state indicates a greater degree of legal recognition of 
a state’s responsibility to pursue sustainable resource use and 
provides a legal prong available for members of the public with an 
interest in sustainability to argue in lawsuits. For example, the 
expanded state Public Trust Doctrine was used in New Jersey to 
justify citizen suits blocking construction of a coastal high rise that 
would block an aesthetic viewshed, arguing that the state must 
                                            
8Raphael D. Sagarin & Mary Turnipseed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Where 
Ecology Meets Natural Resources Management, 37 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ENV’T 
& RES. 473, 481 (2012). 
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manage coastal areas for the benefit of the public.9 Notably, the 
expanded Public Trust Doctrine has been featured prominently in 
recent legal scholarship focused on state responsibility to address 
climate change.10 As increasingly complex questions of state 
responsibility to mitigate to and adapt to climate change in coastal 
areas arise, whether state Public Trust Doctrines continue to expand 
is a salient and critical legal question. 
 Submerged and intertidal lands are a significant focus of the 
Public Trust Doctrine in coastal states in the United States. In much 
of the coastal United States, the intertidal zone between the low 
water line and the high tide line is also state property, held in trust 
by the state and regulated and managed for use by the public under 
the authority of that state’s Public Trust Doctrine. In the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and in the State of Maine (which 
was part of Massachusetts prior to 1820), however, the intertidal 
zone remains the private property of the upland property owner, 
with statutory bundles of rights reserved for the public to access 
these private lands for the purposes of fishing, fowling, and 
navigation.11 Thus, on its face, the case of Ross v. Acadian Seaplants 
Ltd. presented a question of whether access to the intertidal for the 
harvest of Rockweed is protected for the public under the state’s 
Public Trust Doctrine.  
 At issue in the case of Rockweed management, however, is 
not simply who is assigned the right of access to a space. It is about 
how a state regulates the right to use of a resource in that space. In 
the natural resource management texts and economics more broadly, 
resources are frequently categorized into four bins: public goods 
                                            
9  Hope Babcock, Is Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Public Parkland 
from Visual Pollution Justifiable Doctrinal Creep?, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 7 
(2015). 
10 See e.g., Tim Eichenberg, Sean Bothwell & Darcy Vaughn, Climate Change 
and the Public Trust Doctrine: Using an Ancient Doctrine to Adapt to Rising 
Sea Levels in San Francisco Bay, 3 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 245 
(2009); Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: 
The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 59, 66, 75, 89 (2011).  
11 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18 (1894) (citing Massachusetts Colonial 
Ordinance of 1641); see also Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 172 (Me. 
1989) [hereinafter Bell II] (discussing how the Massachusetts Colonial 
Ordinance of 1641 applies to Maine, and the ordinance’s grant of rights for 
fishing, fowling, and navigation).  
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(low excludability, low rivalry of consumption), club goods (high 
excludability, low rivalry of consumption), common pool resources 
(low excludability, high rivalry of consumption) and private goods 
(high excludability, high rivalry of consumption).  By deciding the 
case in one direction or another, the Court was in effect determining 
if a resource was a common pool resource or a private good. The 
Court’s decision not only decided the question in favor of securing 
the right to use Rockweed to the upland property owner, but also by 
determining that Rockweed is a private good in effect curtailed the 
state of Maine’s interest in determining the best course of 
management of a natural resource. At a time when many natural 
resource management agencies around the world and around the 
United States are implementing management pathways that include 
privatizing access to fisheries in an effort to ensure fishery 
sustainability,12 the Court’s decision presents a notable case of 
sudden privatization of all Rockweed fishery access in a state. How 
this decision affects the future of the fishery in Maine will present a 
dramatic case study of rapid privatization. 
 Also at issue in this case is a larger question of how complex 
scientific questions about sustainability and ecological impact 
should be adjudicated. Courts regularly draw on the long-
established common law usage of legal analogy to answer complex 
scientific questions. Yet, in this case, there were detailed scientific 
studies that could have been drawn upon to address the analogy-
based question of “is Rockweed more like a fish (and therefore the 
right to the resource should be held for the public), or more like a 
crop growing in soil (and therefore the private property of the 
landowner)?” However, the Court made determinations as a matter 
of law, and in doing so, failed to address the issue of Rockweed 
management and ownership as a matter of science.  
 
III. ROCKWEED AND ITS ROLE IN MAINE’S COASTAL SOCIAL-
ECOLOGICAL ECOSYSTEM 
 In North America, seaweeds have been used by indigenous 
peoples for millennia and by settler colonists for centuries.  The 
                                            
12 Courtney Carothers & Catherine Chambers, Fisheries Privatization and the 
Remaking of Fishery Systems, 3 ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY 39, 44 (2012).  
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intertidal brown alga Ascophyllum nodosum—commonly called 
Knotted Wrack, or simply Rockweed—grows along northeastern 
coastlines of the United States and in maritime Canada, as well as 
the coastlines of northwestern Europe and Ireland. While 
Ascophyllum nodosum is not consumed directly as food by humans, 
its value as a fertilizer has long been recognized. Dead and dried 
Ascophyllum nodosum that is collected above the high water line has 
long been used as “sea manure” due to its high concentrations of 
macro- and micro-nutrients. More recently, a commercial harvest of 
living Ascophyllum nodosum has emerged. Uses of commercially 
harvested Rockweed include as fertilizer, but also, after processing, 
as a dietary supplement for livestock.13 The shipping industry uses 
Rockweed as a packing material to keep seafood moist for shipping, 
most notably, Maine’s $600 million lobster industry. 
Because of its multiple commercial uses and due to the ease 
of locating it along the coastline, the commercial Rockweed fishery 
has rapidly increased. An established industry in Western Europe 
and maritime Canada, the first commercial harvest of Rockweed in 
Maine began in the 1970s.14 In 2003, Rockweed harvest in Maine 
eclipsed 3.27 million pounds.15 Ten years later, in 2012, Rockweed 
landings had quadrupled, surpassing 14.6 million pounds.16  
Economically, Rockweed harvest brings around $20 million into the 
Maine coastal economy annually.17 
Importantly for disputes about access to Rockweed as a 
resource, these meteoric increases in landings were driven largely 
by the entry into the fishery of a Canadian company – Acadian 
Seaplants, whose harvesters have taken more than 90% of the 
Rockweed harvest annually, primarily in areas on the Cobscook Bay 
region of far eastern Maine.18  
                                            
13 Harinder Makkar et al., Seaweeds for Livestock Diets: a Review, 212 ANIMAL 
FEED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1, 12 (2016). 
14 Maine Dept. of Marine Resources, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR 
ROCKWEED (ASCOPHYLLUM NODOSUM), 1 (2014). 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
17 Maine Sea Grant and Maine Dept. of Marine Resources, Rockweed Ecology, 
Industry and Management Fact Sheet (2013). 
18 Maine Dept. of Marine Resources, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR 
ROCKWEED (ASCOPHYLLUM NODOSUM), 1 (2014). 
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Also due to the rapid increase in landings, the Maine 
Department of Natural Resources decided to develop a Fishery 
Management Plan (Management Plan) to develop rules and 
guidelines for managing the fishery.19 The Management Plan was 
developed by a Plan Development Team including University of 
Maine scientists, state agency staff, conservation organization 
representatives, and Rockweed industry members. Part of the 
impetus for the development of the Management Plan came from 
the rise in landings, but part also came from high profile concerns in 
the academic literature about the ecological implications of 
unregulated harvest of Rockweed for the Maine coastline. In 2012, 
two scientists writing an article in Annals of the New York Academy 
of Sciences concluded, inter alia, “Rockweed has critical value as 
habitat, as food, and as a nutrient source supporting a community of 
over 150 other organisms…Cutting Rockweed has documented 
impacts on the alga itself and on the Rockweed community as a 
whole.”20 These authors reasoned that the Rockweed harvest merits 
a precautionary approach and that no commercial harvest should be 
permitted until further studies of the ecological impact of harvest 
had been completed, stating: “A metric for an ecologically 
sustainable harvest must be based on the data from large-scale, long-
term studies of postharvest recovery of Rockweed morphology, of 
Rockweed community structure and function, and of ecosystem 
impacts. Until this metric is developed and enforceable regulations 
based on it are developed, commercial-scale Rockweed cutting 
should not be permitted.”21 Likening Rockweed beds to “old growth 
forests,” one of the authors of that 2012 paper, Robin Hadlock 
Seeley has also led active activist groups focused on the 
conservation of habitat forming seaweeds.22 Notably, prominent 
algal phycologists have publicly disputed Seeley’s conclusions 
about the sustainability of Rockweed harvest, arguing that cutting 
                                            
19 Id. 
20 Robin H. Seeley & William H. Schlesinger, Sustainable seaweed cutting? The 
Rockweed (Ascophyllum nodosum) industry of Maine and the Maritime 
Provinces, ANNALS OF THE N.Y.C. ACAD. OF SCI., Feb. 2012, at 98. 
21 Id. 
22 Clare Leschin-Hoar, Help for Kelp – Seaweed Slashers See Harvesting Cuts 
Coming, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, May 14, 2014. 
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Rockweed in Maine is sustainable,23 and presenting concerns about 
Rockweed incorrectly being labeled a plant.24 Some studies have 
suggested that cutting Rockweed fronds while leaving sixteen 
inches has only short term effects on local community ecology and 
that there is an increase in medium-sized fronds after cutting 
creating bushier rockweeds post-harvest.25  
 Scientifically, Ascophyllum nodosum is not a plant, but a 
brown alga in the Kingdom Chromista. While it is photosynthetic 
using sunlight, carbon dioxide and water to create biomass and 
grow, it does not create a rooting structure and derives all of its 
nutrients from marine sources rather than from soils. Rockweed 
fixes itself in the intertidal zone through the use of a holdfast, which 
it uses to attach to rocks or other substrates. It maintains buoyancy 
and thus access to sunlight for growth through the use of small air 
bladders. Rockweed reproduces in spring and early summer once 
water temperatures are warm enough. Rockweed produces 
receptacles that subsequently release eggs and sperm into the water 
for external fertilization. While it is scientifically challenging to 
identify a single Rockweed “individual”26 a single Rockweed frond 
growing out of a holdfast can remain in place for decades.27 
 
IV. TREATMENT OF ROCKWEED UNDER MAINE LAW 
                                            
23 Susan Brawley, Look at the Science – Maine harvesting of Rockweed is 
sustainable, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, (Jun. 3, 2014), 
https://bangordailynews.com/2014/06/03/opinion/contributors/look-at-the-
science-maine-harvesting-of-rockweed-is-sustainable/.  
24 Jessica Muhlin & Susan Brawley. Science should be heeded – Rockweed is 
not a plant, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, (Apr. 28, 2019), 
https://bangordailynews.com/2019/04/28/opinion/contributors/science-should-
be-heeded-rockweed-is-not-a-plant/.  
25 Jill C. Fegley, Ecological implications of Rockweed Ascophyllum Nodosum L. 
le jolis, harvesting" (2001) (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maine). 
26 Per Åberg, Distinguishing Between Genetic Individuals in Ascophyllum 
nodosum Populations on the Swedish west Coast." 24 BRITISH PHYCOLOGICAL 
JOURNAL, June 1989 at: 183. 
27 Steve Dudgeon, & Peter S. Petraitis, First year demography of the foundation 
species, Ascophyllum nodosum, and its community implications, 109 OIKOS, no. 
2, 2005 at 405. 
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 The property rights of riparian owners in the state of Maine 
vary based upon the high and low tide marks.28 The state of Maine 
holds the rights of the coastal waters and the submerged land below 
the low tide mark in public trust.29 The upland landowner owns the 
coastal waters and submerged land between the high tide mark and 
the low tide mark, known as the intertidal zone.30 However, there 
are reserved public rights to “fish, fowl and navigate.”31 The land 
above the high tide mark is private, but landowners are allowed to 
grant rights to the public.32 In Maine, private landowners own an 
overwhelming majority of the 3,500 mile coastline.33  
 Unlike other marine resources such as shellfish, Rockweed’s 
life cycle functions similarly to plants (Rockweeds are sessile and 
photosynthetic) and to fish (they derive nutrition from the ocean and 
are exclusively marine).34 Rockweed attaches to rocky substrates 
along the seabed, but does not harvest any nutrients from the soil.35 
This unusual intersection posed many challenges for the legal 
system of rights. Specifically, the Court in Ross v. Acadian 
Seaplants Ltd. had to articulate whether the public trust doctrine that 
covers shellfish covered this macroalga as well. In this case, the 
Court investigated the right to harvest Rockweed under two 
different legal doctrines.36 First, the Court explored whether there 
                                            
28 John Duff et al., PUBLIC SHORELINE ACCESS IN MAINE: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 2 (Catherine Schmidt, 3rd ed. 2006); Public Trust 
Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1014) (defining the public trust 
doctrine as the principle that navigable waters are preserved for the public use, 
and that the state is responsible for protecting the public's right to the use). 
29 John Duff et al., Supra note 23 at 2. 
30Bell, 557 A. 2d at 172 (1989); John Duff et al., supra note 23 at 2. Maine’s 
approach to rights in the intertidal zone is somewhat unique; in several states, 
the intertidal zone is held in trust by the state see The Wildlife Soc’y, supra note 
1 (discussing the application of the public trust doctrine to the marine 
environment in different states).  
31 John Duff et al., supra note 23 at 2. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. This is in contrast to other states, such as Oregon, where the state owns 
from the water up to the line of vegetation. Erin Pitts, The Public Trust 
Doctrine, 22 ENVTL. L. 731, 736 (1992).   
34 Allison L. Schmidt et al., Ecosystem structure and services in eelgrass Zostera 
marina and Rockweed Ascophyllum nodosum habitats, 437 MARINE ECOLOGY 
PROGRESS SERIES 51, 52 (2011). 
35 Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, *2 
(Me. Super. 2017); Schmidt et al., supra note 29 at 52.  ROCKWEED 
36 Ross, No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, at *1-4.  
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are public rights to Rockweed within the intertidal zone, under the 
doctrine of profit a pendre 37  Second, the Court addressed whether 
or not the harvest of Rockweed was a protected public right under 
the public trust doctrine.38 This section will explore the history of 
the two doctrines, and their legal application to Rockweed.  
 
A.  Profit a Pendre 
 
 The right to profit from the taking of a part of the soil or 
product of the land of another is known as a profit a prendre.39 
However, Maine law considers aquatic access rights held by those 
who do not own the soil to be easements.40 In the 1861 case of Hill 
v. Lord,41 the Court addressed the issue of whether or not the public 
had a right to harvest dried seaweed as “sea manure” from the 
intertidal zone.42 The Court focused on whether or not the right to 
harvest seaweed from a privately held intertidal zone was an 
easement or a profit a prendre.43 The importance in the distinction 
was that the inhabitants of the town would be able to claim an 
easement by custom only if the harvest of seaweed was considered 
an easement, and not a profit a prendre, because a right to the land 
cannot be acquired by custom if the landowner holds a profit a 
prendre.44 
 In Hill v. Lord, the Court identified that the owner of the 
intertidal zone holds title to the seaweed on the flats, so long as the 
owner has not severed that right.45 The Court determined that the 
right to harvest seaweed was a profit a prendre and not an 
                                            
37 A profit a prendre right grants the landowners the rights to profit from the 
bounty of their lands. Further discussion of profits a prendre is provided in the 
next section. Ross, No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, at *2. 
38 Ross, No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, at *2-4. 
39 28A C.J.S. Easements § 14 (2017) (explaining that a “profit a prendre “right” 
gives the profit holder the right to sever and remove from the land of another a 
physical substance.” For example the right to hunt and fish on another’s land is a 
profit a prendre.). 
40 Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83, 96 (1861) 
41 Id. at 83-101.  
42 Id. at 96.  
43 Id. at 98.  
44 Id. at 97-99. 
45 Id. at 96.  
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easement.46 To reach this conclusion, the Court compared the 
harvest of seaweed to the (1) cutting of grass and hay; (2) grazing of 
livestock; (3) hunting; and (4) fishing from an un-navigable 
stream.47 Acknowledging that aquatic rights are generally 
easements, the Court still determined that the harvest of dried 
seaweed washed upon the seashore was a right to take profit in the 
soil.48 Therefore, the inhabitants of Kennebunkport were barred 
from harvesting such seaweed on the private property, because the 
landowner had not deeded away the right to harvest.49  
 In the present case that serves as the focal point of this 
article, the lower court used both profit a prendre and the public 
trust doctrine analysis to determine who holds the right to harvest 
Rockweed.50 Under the profit a prendre analysis, the lower court 
relied on the Hill v. Lord holding, finding that the right to harvest is 
a profit a prendre.51 The trial court determined that the landowner 
holds the profit right of Rockweed in fee simple, and has complete 
control over the right to harvest Rockweed.52 And in this case, the 
landowner had not deeded that right to the public or Acadian 
Seaplants.53 In making this decision, the court had to circumvent the 
Acadian Seaplants’ argument that Hill v. Lord applies only to 
seaweed once washed upon the shore, citing Anthony v. Gifford.54 
In Gifford, the Massachusetts court55 held that once seaweed and 
other marine plants detach from the intertidal floor and wash onto 
the seashore, the rights vest in the landowner.56 In short, until the 
seaweed washes onto the seashore, the upland owner has no rights 
                                            
46Id. at 101.  
47 Id. at 99-100. 
48 Id. at 83, 98-101. 
49 Id. at 100-101. 
50 Ross, No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, at *2. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 3. 
53 Id. at 3-4. 
54 Id. at 4. 
55 Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 (1810); Bell, 557 A. 2d at 172 (the “rule of 
law governing titles to intertidal land had its origin in the Colonial Ordinance of 
1641-47 of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and long before the separation of 
Maine was received into the common law of Massachusetts by long usage and 
practice throughout the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.”).  
56 Anthony v. Gifford, 84 Mass. 549, 549 (1861).  
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to the seaweed.57 The defendant argued that private rights of 
Rockweed attach, only after Rockweed detaches from the rockbed.58 
The court, however, found that Gifford does not apply, because 
Gifford failed to speak directly to the harvest of seaweed that is still 
attached to the intertidal rock floor, and not floating with the tide.59 
To conclude, the lower court held that the landowner owns the rights 
to the Rockweed in the intertidal zone, because the landowner had 
not deeded this right to the public or to the defendant.60 This 
conclusion destroyed the claim that Rockweed harvesters gleaned 
rights to the Rockweed by custom—an argument afforded only if 
the landowner does not hold a profit a prendre right.61  
 
B.  The Public Trust Doctrine 
 
 States have the authority to assert regulatory power over the 
coastal zone via either the police power, or the public trust 
doctrine.62  Under the police power, the state has legislative power 
to protect public health, safety, and welfare.63 However, the police 
power is subject to limitations on its power to create coherent coastal 
management programs.64 The police power is specialized enough to 
deal with conflicting legitimate coastal uses.65 Further, states 
traditionally use the police power to restrict harmful activities, and 
the use of the police power is infantile in creating affirmative 
proactive management plans.66 Finally, the police power can result 
                                            
57 Id.  
58 See Ross, No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, at *2-4 (arguing that the 
landowner’s rights to seaweed does not attach until it washes ashore).  
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See Hill, 48 Me.at 99 (explaining that the public cannot glean rights via 
custom if landowners hold a profit a prendre).  
62 JACK A. CAREY ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE MANAGEMENT 
OF AMERICA’S COASTS, 3 (1994); U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
63 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 422, 456 (1827); JACK A. CAREY ET AL., 
supra note 57, at 3. 
64 JACK A. CAREY ET AL., supra note 62, at 3. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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in a regulatory taking if the result of the regulation goes “too far.”67 
Therefore, states often rely on the use of the public trust doctrine in 
conjunction with the police power.68  
 The Public Trust Doctrine is an ancient property law 
principle, originating from the English common law.69 The public 
trust doctrine, as a principle, exists in every state.70 The general rule 
is that (a) all tidelands and navigable waters owned by the thirteen 
colonies transferred title to the existing states via succession; (b) the 
states own the tidelands and navigable waters subject to a “public 
trust” to benefit all citizens with certain usage rights related to 
maritime commerce, navigation and fishing; and (c) all land granted 
from the state to private landowners is subject to the public trust.71  
In the United States, the use of coastal lands and the natural 
resources located over such lands and waters out to 3 nautical miles 
is a matter of state law—with few exceptions.72 The scope of the 
                                            
67 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); Penn Central 
Transportation Company v. City of  New York, 483 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) 
(finding three factors in regulatory takings analysis: economic impact; character 
of government action; and interference with investment backed expectations); 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 451 (1982) 
(holding that a permanent physical invasion of private property is a taking per 
se); JACK A. CAREY ET AL., supra note 62, at 3.. 
68 JACK H. ARCHER CAREY ET AL., supra note 62, at 3. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 3-4. 
72 JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., supra note 57, at 7. For a thorough discussion on the 
“the complex mosaic of authorities” governing coastal law see generally  U.S. 
COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, REVIEW OF U.S. OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW, THE 
EVOLUTION OF OCEAN GOVERNANCE OVER THREE DECADES, APPENDIX 6 TO AN 
OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 2 (2004)  (Discussing the various 
statutes that govern the coast and noting that “U.S. law divides authority and 
responsibility between federal and state governments” and then explaining 
Pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act (SLA), states hold title to the submerged 
lands and the natural resources in such lands and waters out to 3 nautical miles. . 
.  subject to certain reservations.”); see Phillips Petroleum Co. v.. Mississippi, 
484 U.S. 469, 474 (1988) )(“he individual States have the authority to define the 
limits of the lands held in the public trust and to recognize private rights in such 
lands as they see fit”); see also Bell II 557 A.2d at 182 (Wathen, J., dissenting) 
(stating “it is…beyond a doubt that the determination of public and private 
rights in the intertidal land is fundamentally a matter of state law,” and 
providing an extensive list of support).  
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state power to regulate public trust lands “is directly related to the 
public interests that the doctrine is intended to protect.”73 In Shivley 
v. Bowlbly, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of the public 
trust doctrine is to guarantee that tidelands are put to the best uses 
for the public interest.74  
 In Maine, the public trust doctrine is rooted in the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony Ordinances of 1641 and 1647.75 To 
encourage private landowners to invest in structures that ventured 
below the high water mark, the General Court of the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony enacted the 1647 ordinance granting, “upland owners 
property rights down to the low water mark,” and the public the 
rights to the intertidal zone for “fishing, fowling, and navigation.”76 
Massachusetts incorporated the concepts of the Ordinance into 
common law.77 Later, when Maine achieved statehood, “the 
principles of the Ordinance were said to be adopted into Maine’s 
common law under Article X of the Maine Constitution.”78 
However, Maine did not explicitly adopt the language of the 
Ordinance.79 The Maine judiciary sustained the custom of private 
ownership of the intertidal zone that originated with the 
Ordinance.80 
 The Maine Judiciary has always accepted that the public “at 
large” has the rights to “fish, fowl and navigate” within the intertidal 
zone.81 However, the interpretation of the scope of the right 
                                            
73 JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., supra note 57, at 10. 
74 Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 12 (1894). 
75 Hill, 48 Me. at 94 (1861); Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509, 511-13 (Me. 
1986) [hereinafter Bell I]; Town of Wellfleet v. Glaze, 525 N.E.2d 1298, 1300 
(Mass. 1988).    
76 Benjamin Donaghue, McGarvey v. Whittredge: Continued Uncertainty in 
Maine’s Intertidal Zone, 64 MAINE L. REV. , no. 2, 2012, at 597 citing THE 
BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAUUS AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING  THE 
INHABITANTS OF MASSACHUSETTS 5, reprinted in THE GENERAL LAWES AND 
LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS, 35 
(Thomas G. Barnes ed., 1975).  
77 Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 (1810); Donaghue, supra note 73, at 597.  
78 Id.; ME. CONST.  art. X §§ 3, 5; Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85, 93 (1831). 
79 Bell II, 557 A. 2d at 184. 
80 Id.; see also Donahue, supra note 73, at 597 (discussing how the Ordinance 
transitioned into Maine common law). 
81 Bell I,, 510 A.2d at 510 (stating that the traditional uses enumerated in the 
ordinance are protected under the Public Trust Doctrine and noting that the 
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enumerated in the ordinance has varied over time. Under one 
approach, the public rights to “fish,” “fowl,” and “navigate” can 
only extend to a “natural derivative” of one of the enumerative 
rights.82 The other approach finds that the court is not bound to the 
literal uses enumerated in the ordinance.83  
 Strict interpretation of the Ordinance derives from the Bell 
cases. In Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986) (Bell I), 
the issue in the lower court was whether the public had a right to 
access to Moody Beach for recreational purposes.84 In Bell I, the 
Maine Supreme Court addressed (1) whether the lower court 
properly dismissed the case because the state was the trustee of 
public rights in the beach, and (2) whether the state interest made 
the state and indispensable party, and therefore barred the plaintiff’s 
quiet title actions under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.85 The 
court vacated the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs (owners of 
property adjacent to the coast) hold fee in title to the intertidal land 
under the Ordinance. Therefore, in Bell I the Court did not address 
whether the public trust doctrine grants the public an easement to 
access the intertidal zone for recreation, and therefore did not reach 
analysis regarding the scope of the public trust doctrine.86 
 Three years later in Bell II, Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d. 
168 (Me. 1989), the Court did assess the scope of the public trust 
doctrine relating to recreation.87 The Majority started by stating that 
oceanfront owners hold a fee simple interest in the intertidal zone 
subject only to the easements stated in the Ordinance. Next, the 
Majority stated the public easement in the intertidal zone does not 
extend beyond that “reserved” in the colonial ordinance “broadly 
                                            
Court is forced to help decipher the nature and scope of the three rights under 
the Maine Public Trust Doctrine). 
82 Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (1974).   
83 Donahue, supra note 73, at 597. Cases that demonstrate this interpretation 
include: French V. Camp, 18 Me. 433, 434 (1841) (finding that the public has 
the right to use the intertidal zone as a public highway when covered in ice); 
Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co., 103 Me. 37, 48 (1907) (holding that the public 
has a right to land and offload a vessel within the intertidal zone). 
84 Bell I, 510 A 2d. at 510 (Me. 1986).  
85 Id at 515-518.  
86 Id. at 518; See also Bell II, 557 A. 2d at 171, n. 8 (providing a concise 
summary of the holding in Bell I). 
87  Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173.  
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construed.” Citing Barrows v. McDermott88, the Majority observed 
that the public holds the rights to “fish,” “fowl,” and “navigate” for 
pleasure, as well as for business or sustenance.89 Next, the Majority 
stated that the Court has generally given a “sympathetically 
generous interpretation of what is encompassed within the three 
terms “fishing,” “fowling,” and “navigation,” or reasonably 
incidental or related thereto.”90 Next, the Court held that the 
plaintiff’s claim that the public has a general recreation easement to 
use Moody Beach, “cannot be justified as encompassed in, or 
reasonably related to ‘fishing,’ ‘fowling’ or ‘navigation.”91 
Reaching this conclusion, the Majority stated that to expand the 
ordinance to recreation would equate to the Court legislating from 
the bench, because there is no basis in finding a general recreation 
easement embodied in the ordinance.92 As well, the Majority 
explained that adding an easement for recreation would make the 
aggregate easement more burdensome on the landowners.93 In short, 
the Majority in Bell II acknowledged that the interpretation of the 
ordinance is reserved to a broad construction of the terms 
enumerated, and held that the Ordinance does not grant the public 
an easement for general recreation.94 This remarks a stark change in 
the court’s approach to the public trust doctrine. Before Bell II, the 
Court’s recognized that public rights to the intertidal zone were not 
static, and that the rights could evolve over time.95 Bell II marks a 
dramatic change from the dynamic approach to interpreting the 
Ordinance, and instead applied a strict textual interpretation. 96 
                                            
88 Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 449 (1882). 
89 Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 176. 
93 Id. at 175.  
94 Id. at 176. 
95 Donahue, supra note 74, at 604 (stating that prior to Bell II the Maine 
Supreme Court precedent acknowledged that “the jus publicum” represents 
public rights that are not static, but that evolve and change with time…Only in 
Bell II did [the Court] interpret the Ordinance to constrain the public’s rights to 
those uses enumerated”) citing French, 18 Me.at 434; and Marshall v. Walker, 
93 Me. 532, 536 (1900) as examples of the dynamic approach to public rights to 
the intertidal zone.  
96 Donahue, supra note 74, at 604.  
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 The three justice Dissent in Bell II disagreed.97 Led by 
Justice Wathen, the dissent stated that public recreational rights are 
“not confined strictly to ‘fishing,’ ‘fowling,’ and ‘navigation’ 
however ‘sympathetically generous’ the interpretation of those 
terms might be.”98 The dissent emphasized that the Ordinance was 
not the “exclusive and preeminent” source of all public rights in 
Maine.99 Instead, the dissent highlighted that public rights to the 
intertidal zone existed at common law before the Ordinance, and 
that the Ordinance did not “displace” those rights.100 Moreover, the 
policy forwarded by the Majority leads to exclusion—a result at 
odds with the function and history of the public trust doctrine in the 
intertidal zone.101 Next, the Dissent focused on the large body of 
precedent that strayed away from reasonable interpretation of the 
terms “fishing,” “fowling,” and “navigation.”102 Finally, the Dissent 
concluded that the case “does not require that we delineate the outer 
limits of public rights,” but did argue that the public’s rights are “at 
a minimum broad enough to include such recreational activities as 
bathing, sunbathing, and walking.” 103 Moreover, the Dissent struck 
at the Majority’s policy argument, and stated that recreation does 
not place an additional burden on shoreowners.104 Finally, the 
Dissent argued that “any further refinement [of the public’s rights 
under the Ordinance] should await common law development or 
legislative action.” 105 All in all, the Bell II dissent found the public’s 
rights under the ordinance and common law were broad enough to 
include recreation. 106 And, unlike the Majority, the Dissent 
maintained the dynamic approach to interpreting the Ordinance—
permitting uses besides those included in the Ordinance.107 The 
dichotomy between the Majority and dissent illustrates the sharp 
dissimilarity between the two approaches to analyzing public rights 
                                            
97 Bell II, 557 A.2d at 180. 
98 Id.   
99 Id.  
100 Id 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 185-190. 
103 Id. at 189. 
104 Id.  
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 187-89. 
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to the intertidal zone. However, both the Majority and Dissent noted 
that further refinement of the public rights in the intertidal zone 
should be addressed by the legislature.108  
In 2011, McGarvey v. Whittredge strayed from the strict 
analysis in Bell II, and highlights the more liberal approach to 
interpretation of the Ordinance.109 The Court indicated that prior to 
Bell II, a more expansive and holistic approach to interpreting the 
colonial ordinance’s access rights was the standard.110 Using the 
dissent in Bell II, the Court articulated a two-part test.111 First, the 
Court determines if the intended activity in the intertidal falls 
“readily” within “fishing,” “fowling,” or “navigation.”112 If the 
answer is yes, the activity is a public right.113 If not, the second 
question is applied: should the court read the common law to 
incorporate the activity as protected under the public trust 
doctrine?114 The McGarvey Court then applied the test to determine 
whether or not the public right extends to allow the public to walk 
across the intertidal lands to SCUBA dive.115 The Court held the 
access to the private lands of the intertidal zone for SCUBA diving 
was a public right.116  
 The McGarvey decision left the three enumerated terms in 
the ordinance open to further interpretation beyond the text of 
“fishing,” “fowling,” or “navigation.”117 In effect, the decision 
cracked the door for modern expansion of the traditional 
easements—extending public access to the intertidal zone to 
SCUBA divers.118 Of the three enumerated rights, the harvest of 
Rockweed is most similar to fishing. As such, the majority of the 
next section will discuss precedent under the fishing easement, and 
how the Court in Ross v. Acadian Seaplants Ltd. applied the 
McGarvey test. The harvest of Rockweed, however, may also 
                                            
108 Id. at 176, 189.  
109 McGarvey, 28 A. 3d at 620.  





115 Id.  
116 Id.  
117 Compare McGarvey v, 28 A. 3d 620 at 622, with Bell, 557 A. 2d at 173. 
118 McGarvey, 28 A. 3d at 622.  
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require “navigation.” Under “navigation,” the activity must involve 
some mode of transportation.119 The Court has found that the act of 
mooring vessels and loading cargo has been protected under the 
public trust doctrine.120 The underlying rationale behind the 
“navigation” element of the Maine public trust doctrine is that “state 
owned waters are of a common right, a public highway, for the use 
of all the citizens.”121 The Court has also found that travel on 
intertidal land to get to and from land or houses also fell under 
“navigation.”122 All-in-all, the Maine Public Trust Doctrine serves 
to maintain public access and use of the intertidal zone for “fishing, 
fowling, and navigation” based activities. Maine and Massachusetts 
courts have often been required to identify the extent of the public 
right to “fish” within the intertidal zone.123 In Town of Wellfleet v. 
Glaze, the Court addressed whether the state had the authority to 
grant permits to plant, grow, and harvest shellfish within the 
intertidal zone.124 The court first acknowledged that the public right 
to fish included the right to dig for shellfish.125 Generally, the right 
to fish expands to both moving fish in the water, and those 
embedded in the mud, including the digging of worms.126 While 
Town of Wellfleet was decided on jurisdictional grounds,127 a two-
justice concurrence explored the merits of the case, including the 
distinction between naturally occurring shellfish and farmed 
shellfish.128 The O’Connor concurrence found that “Aquaculture is 
not fishing, nor can it be considered a natural derivative of the right 
to fish.”129 The concurrence further highlighted that the right to fish 
                                            
119 French v. Camp, 18 Me.433, 434-35 (1841).  
120 Deering v. Proprietors of Long Wharf 25 Me. 51, 65 (1845).  
121 French, 18 Me. at 34.  
122 Deering, 25 Me. at 65.  
123 See Town of Wellfleet v. Glaze, 525 N.E. 2d 1298, 1300 (Mass. 1988) 
(exploring the scope of fishing under the Maine public trust doctrine).    
124 Id. at 1299. .   
125 Town of Wellfleet, 525 N.E. at 1301 citing Commonwealth v. Howes, 169 
N.E 806, 808 (1930). 
126 Proctor v. Wells, 102 Mass. 216, 217 (1869); State v. Lemar, 87 A. 2d 886, 
886 (1952). 
127 Town of Wellfleet, 525 N.E. 2d at 1302.   
128 Id. at 1302-04.   
129 Id. at 1303.   
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cannot be construed to include rights to plant, cultivate or harvest 
fish within the intertidal zone.130  
 In Ross v. Acadian Seaplants Ltd., the trial court applied the 
McGarvey test.131 Under the first prong of McGarvey, the court 
found no similarity or reasonable correlation between fishing and 
the harvest of Rockweed—despite the court’s acknowledgement 
that there is an easement to harvest shellfish and dig for worms.132 
The trial court found that harvesting a terrestrial plant was no more 
similar to fishing than cutting down a tree and emphasized that 
Rockweed is a terrestrial plant.133 Classifying Rockweed as a 
terrestrial plant is taxonomically incorrect—it is a brown alga that is 
as closely related to vascular plants as it is to multicellular animals. 
It also does not acknowledge Rockweed’s full life cycle—unlike 
terrestrial plants, Rockweed derives no nutrients from the land and 
reproduces through external fertilization in ocean water134 
Furthermore, because waves break Rockweed loose from the 
substrate, which then floats in the intertidal zone, defining 
Rockweed as a plant presents a challenge. Rockweed “has an 
enchanted double life” as both a kind-of plantlike organism and a 
kind-of fish or shellfish-like organism.135 As a result, classifying 
Rockweed under the public trust doctrine requires the court to 
fabricate a general definition, which does not properly represent 
what the published scientific literature understands.  
  Moving to the second prong of the test, the trial court did not 
interpret the common law to protect the harvest of Rockweed.136 The 
court looked to similar public easements protected under the public 
trust doctrine to differentiate the harvest of Rockweed.137  The court 
acknowledged the public holds an easement to harvest shellfish or 
                                            
130 Id.   
131 Ross, No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566 at *4. 
132Id. 
133 Id. 
134 See UNIV. PUGET SOUND, Rockweed, 
https://www.pugetsound.edu/academics/academic-resources/slater-
museum/exhibits/marine-panel/rockweed/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2018) (explaining 
that waves and current break the holdfast from the substrate, causing the 
Rockweed to remain floating in the intertidal zone),  
135 Ben Goldfarb, A Fish Called Rockweed, HAKAI, May 28, 2019.  
136 Ross, No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, at *4. 
137 Id. 
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to dig for clams, but not to harvest the mussel bed or to take ice.138 
The Court then looked to Hill v. Lord, to determine if there is a 
public easement related to the harvest of seaweed.139 The court 
found Hill dissimilar because in that case the Court upheld a public 
right to harvest of seaweed under the theory profit a prendre and not 
an easement. 140  As a result, the court did not find Hill persuasive 
in supporting that there was a public easement to harvest Rockweed. 
Therefore, the court did not find that the common law “should be 
understood” to include the harvest of rockweed, so the court did not 
find an easement under the second prong of the McGarvey test.141 
Unable to meet either element of the McGarvey test, the court did 
not find a public right to harvest Rockweed in the intertidal zone.142  
 
V. THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE DECISION 
 
In Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd.,143 the Court reviewed the 
lower court decision, and explained the limited issue before the 
court as “whether living Rockweed, growing on and attached to 
intertidal land is—as Ross asserts—the private property of the 
adjoining upland owner who owns the intertidal zone in fee, or—as 
Acadian counters—a public resource held in trust by the state.”144 
The Court acknowledged that the case “draws [the court] into the 
confluence of public and private property rights within the intertidal 
zone,”145 and concluded, “the public may not harvest living 
Rockweed growing in and attached to the privately-owned intertidal 
zone.” 146 
The Court began by accepting that the nature and extent of 
the public’s interest in the intertidal zone is subject to “much debate, 
litigation, and judicial writing,” and admitting that the precedent 
does not clearly establish a delineation between the public and 




141 Id. at 7. 
142 Id.  
143 2019 ME 45, 206 A. 3d 283. 
144 Id. ¶ 8. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. ¶ 14.  
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private rights in and to the intertidal zone.147 The Court then focused 
on the analytical frameworks articulated in the McGarvey majority 
and concurrence. 148  Chief Justice Saufley’s approach in McGarvey 
explained that the three terms fishing, fowling, and navigation 
should be broadly understood.149 While Justice Levy’s concurrence 
in McGarvey analyzed the terms based “on the limiting principle 
that the enumerated rights of ‘fishing,’ ‘fowling,’ and ‘navigation’ 
were ‘never understood …to merely establish a context for some 
broader right or rights.’”150  
The Court started its analysis with the final term of the 
trilogy - “navigation.” The Court acknowledged that there is a 
navigational component of harvesting Rockweed because harvesters 
operate skiffs in the intertidal waters to harvest the Rockweed.151 
However, the Court found that no matter how broadly the term 
“navigation” is construed,152 the harvesting of Rockweed involves 
the use of the intertidal land itself, because “living Rockweed is 
attached to the intertidal substrate even if it does not draw nutrients 
from the land.”153 Acknowledging that Rockweed harvesting does 
include the use of boats, the Court highlighted that the use of boats 
are a secondary activity to the harvest of Rockweed.154 Rockweed 
harvesters enter the intertidal zone with their primary purpose being 
to cut and take rockweed.155 The Court concluded that the term 
“navigation” does not encompass harvesting living Rockweed from 
the intertidal zone, because Acadian Seaplants’ primary use of the 
intertidal waters is not for crossing water or land, but is to gain 
access to the attached Rockweed.156  
 The Court then turned to “fishing.” Despite the shape 
shifting nature of this algae, that belongs neither in the animal or 
plant kingdom,157 the Court started by stating that Rockweed is a 
                                            
147 Id. ¶ 13.  
148 Id. ¶ 15.  
149 Id. ¶¶ 15-16 (citing McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 56) 
150Id. ¶ 18; McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 62.  
151 Id. ¶ 22.  
152 Id. 
153 Id. ¶ 22.  
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  
157 Ben Goldfarb, A Fish Called Rockweed, HAKAI, May 28, 2019.  
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plant.158 As well, the Court highlighted that Rockweed is 
biologically dissimilar from fish, lobster, clams, oysters, and 
bloodworms because “[rockweed] draws nutrients from the air and 
seawater using a photosynthetic process and, once attached to the 
intertidal substrate, [do not] move.”159 The Court then concluded that 
even an overly generous interpretation of the public’s rights “cannot 
transform the harvesting of a marine plant into ‘fishing.’”160   
Having determined that the harvesting of Rockweed does not 
fall within the public right to use the intertidal zone for “fishing” or 
“navigation,” the Court analyzed the harvesting of Rockweed under 
Justice Levy’s concurrence in McGarvey: whether “the common 
law approach permits the public to harvest Rockweed as an activity 
that constitutes a ‘reasonable balance’ between the public’s rights 
within the intertidal zone and the private property interest held by 
the upland property owner.”161 The Court found that the burden of 
cutting and removing plants with specialized equipment is not a 
reasonable burden the landowner should bear.162 Acadian and other 
harvesters use specialized equipment and skiffs with multi-ton 
capacity.163 Moreover, “Acadian’s activity is qualitatively similar to 
other uses of the intertidal zone that [the Court has] held are outside 
of the public trust doctrine.”164 Therefore, the right to harvest 
Rockweed does not strike a reasonable balance between public 
rights and the burden imposed on private landowners. Unable to find 
the harvest of Rockweed as a public right under “fishing” or 
“navigation” the Court held that the harvest of Rockweed is not a 
public right.  
  Chief Justice Saufley filed a concurring opinion in which 
Justice Mead and Gorman joined.165 The concurrence joined the 
result, but stated that the three justices wanted to explicitly overrule 
the Bell II decision. Chief Justice Saufley stated that the Bell II 
decision required the Judiciary to force an activity in question into 
the definition of “fishing, fowling, or navigation,” and as a result, 
                                            
158 Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 22.  
159 Id. ¶ 27. 
160 Id. ¶ 26. 
161 Id. (citing McGarvey, 28 A. 3d 620).  
162 Id. 
163 Id. ¶ 31.  
164 Id.   
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“significant and expensive” litigation has plagued the state.166 
Moreover, the Bell II decision has required the court to dodge or 
rearticulate Bell II: “That decision—Bell II—has been questioned, 
pretzeled, and avoided,” Justice Saufley wrote.167 The concurrence 
wanted to adopt Justice Wathen’s dissent in Bell II, allowing the 
common law to continue to develop, and emphasized “the public 
deserves [this] correction.”168 
 
VI. WHAT THE ROCKWEED DECISION MEANS FOR MAINE 
 
 The recent Maine Supreme Court decision in Ross v. 
Acadian Seaplants Ltd. will force change across all sectors now that 
private landowners hold the title to Rockweed in the intertidal zone. 
Industry, local communities, the Maine Government, landowners 
and the public must adjust. 
 
A.  Acadian Seaplants: Withdrawing from Maine? 
 
 Acadian Seaplants may cease their harvest of Rockweed 
within the state of Maine. Acadian Seaplants Limited (Acadian) was 
founded in 1981, and is located in Vancouver, Canada.169 Acadian 
harvests seaweed along Atlantic North America, Ireland, and 
Scotland.170 Acadian’s Environmental Policy explicitly highlights 
that the Acadian team is committed to follow Canadian federal, 
municipal and provincial law.171 Further, Acadian is dedicated to 
maintaining strong international relationships.172  
To avoid private trespass claims, Acadian must now obtain 
a license or easement from landowners if they wish to continue the 
                                            
166Id. ¶42. 
167 Id. ¶40. 
168 Id. ¶42. 
169 See Acadian Seaplants Limited, About Us, 
http://www.acadianseaplants.com/marine-plant-seaweed-manufacturers (last 
visited 3/27/2018) (describing Acadian Seaplants Limited’s mission statement, 
history, and location).  
170 Id. (stating the locations Acadian Seaplants harvests sea products). 
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harvest of Rockweed within privately owned intertidal zones.173 A 
profit a prendre encompasses the right of the public to come in and 
harvest an item “from the soil.”174 A license subverts private trespass 
actions by providing the licensee with permission to do something 
on the land of another.175 Therefore, in order to avoid trespass 
claims, Acadian must draft agreements with intertidal landowners, 
to continue the harvest of Rockweed. In consideration of these 
agreements, Acadian will likely have to pay for access to Rockweed. 
Simple payment systems could be based on (1) the length of the 
lease; (2) the amount of Rockweed harvested from the property; 
and/or (3) the predicted productivity of the site. It is important to 
note that the landowner can always revoke the agreement.176 The 
ability to revoke profits a prendre may serve as a check on 
Rockweed harvest in some respect; landowners, who do not approve 
of how Acadian operates, or treats the intertidal zone, can revoke the 
profit a prendre.  However, with the landowner holding the rights, 
the landowner’s interests will always dominate. Acadian can no 
longer harvest Rockweed solely under Maine regulation, but must 
contract separately with individual private landowners.  
Profits a prendre are not Acadian’s only option. In lieu of 
the privatization of the intertidal zone, Acadian can elect to cease 
harvest of Rockweed from Maine. The habitat range of Rockweed 
extends from Canadian intertidal zones, and from the shores of 
Norway down to Portugal. Therefore, Acadian can elect to only 
harvest from Labrador, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and in Europe. 
 
B.  Maine’s Rockweed Employees: Out of a Job, or a New  
  Opportunity? 
 
The Maine Seafood industry is at a crossroads. The harvest 
of staple Maine seafood products such as groundfish, clams and 
                                            
173 See Profits a prendre and Licenses Distinguished, §8 Maine Practice Series: 
Real Estate Law and Practice (stating that a profit a prendre is a right of the 
common, whereas a license is applies only to the user).  
174 Id.; Beckwith v. Rossi, 175 A. 2d 732, 734 (1961); Fiske v. Small, 25 Me. 
453, 457 (1845); 
175 Id. 
176 Id.  
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shrimp have reduced drastically in past years.177 However, seaweed 
harvest has been on the incline.178 Harvest of seaweed in Maine has 
increased 250% in less than seven years.179 In 2013, Rockweed 
harvesters accounted for 10 million dollars of the Maine economy.180  
Further, over half of Maine towns experience beneficial secondary 
economic impact from Rockweed harvest.181  
The four major Rockweed companies employ on average 
110 harvesters, and another 115 dock and plant employees.182 In the 
event that large Rockweed harvesters leave Maine, employees and 
small local harvesters will be impacted based on how private 
landowners act in light of their new right to Rockweed.  
Privatization of the intertidal zone may actually benefit local 
harvesting outfits. Similar to Acadian, local harvesters are forced to 
cooperate with local landowners to gain access to harvest 
Rockweed, via profit a prendre or license.183 Unlike Acadian, local 
harvesters may have better ability to contract with local landowners 
for access. First, local landowners are more likely to know local 
harvesters, easing the discussion over access, and may encourage 
the landowners to grant profit a prendre rights to the local 
harvesters. Second, local landowners can stress the impact on the 
local economy from local harvest of Rockweed, further 
incentivizing landowners to contract with local harvesters. 
However, large harvesting operations, like Acadian likely have 
more access to capital, which can be a powerful tool in the 
bargaining process. Therefore, if pure economic gain is the motive 
of the landowner, large harvesting companies may be able to prevail 
in sealing profit a prendre rights. In the event that large harvesting 
                                            
177  MAINE SEAWEED COUNCIL. Working Waterfront, 
http://www.seaweedcouncil.org/working-waterfront/ (last visited Jun. 26, 2020). 
178 Id.  
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
181 Id. For example, the purchasing of fuel and supplies for Rockweed harvest 
can help support local Maine businesses. 
182 PETE THAYER & KATHERINE SCHMIDT, ROCKWEED ECOLOGY, INDUSTRY AND 
MANAGEMENT Rockweed Ecology, Industry and Management, 2 (2014). 
183 Profits a prendre and Licenses Distinguished; Beckwith, 175 Me at 743; 
Fiske, 25 Me. at 457. 1 MAINE PRACTICE SERIES, REAL ESTATE LAW & 
PRACTICE § 8:2 (2d ed.); Beckwith v. Rossi, 175 A.2d 732, 738 (1961); Fiske v. 
Small, 25 Me. 453, 457 (1845). 
 
262 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:2 
 
operations elect to cease the harvest of Rockweed in Maine, local 
Rockweed harvesters can benefit from reduced competition. Under 
this trend, the local harvesters will be able to contract with 
landowners to harvest rockweed.  
 
C. Maine Department of Marine Resources: Managing  
                        Rockweed, Rockweed Harvest, and Public Access to 
                        Rockweed Harvest 
 
In 2014, the Maine Department of Marine Resources 
(Department) published a Fishery Management Plan for 
Rockweed.184 The plan outlined the current management measures in 
place in Maine as well as policy recommendations for the future.185 
One recommendation in the Plan was to implement coast-wide 
sector management.186 The rationale behind sectoring the coastline 
was for monitoring purposes.187 The policy recommended that the 
Department allocate each sector to a private entity for harvest over 
a predetermined number of years.188 A re-evaluation of the sectors 
and their ecological status occurs at the end of the contract for 
harvest.189 
  Privatization of the intertidal zone for Rockweed changes the 
Department’s strategy. The Department has said publicly that it 
retains the general power to regulate the harvest of Rockweed, 
despite the Court ruling.190 The Department can open and close areas 
                                            
184 Maine Dept. of Marine Resources, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR 
ROCKWEED (ASCOPHYLLUM NODOSUM), 1 (2014). Fishery Management Plan for 
Rockweed (Ascophyllum nodosum), MAINE DEPT. OF MARINE RESOURCES, 
January 2014 at 1.  
185 Id. at 27, 33-38.  
186 Id. at 33.  
187 Id.  
188 Id.  
189 Id.  
190 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 6807 (2001) (“The commissioner may 
adopt rules regulating the harvest of seaweed on a species specific basis, 
including, but not limited to, the total number of licenses that may be 
issued, the designation of a harvesting season or seasons, the quantity of the 
resource that may be harvested in a season, areas that may be open or closed to 
harvest and gear and techniques that may be used in harvesting. Rules adopted 
under this section are routine technical rules pursuant to Title 5, chapter 375, 
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of the coast for Rockweed harvest.191 However, allocating harvest 
areas is no longer the Department’s sole discretion, and as of 
October 2019, Maine Marine Patrol has begun to respond to 
landowner complaints of possible Rockweed theft from intertidal 
shorelines.192 In short, while the Department cannot now solely grant 
a harvester permission to harvest, they can always prevent the 
harvest. Thus, the ability to harvest Rockweed requires two 
permissions: landowner and agency. Likely, the Department can still 
address the goals provided in the Fishery Management Plan, but the 
approach will have to change. The Department may have to require 
landowner recording of profits a prendre rights, and then regulate 
the opening of private intertidal zones, based on the fishery.193  
 
D.  Private Landowners: A New Right Added to the Bundle 
 of Sticks 
Landowners may now choose what happens to the 
Rockweed located in the intertidal zone, subject to the Department’s 
approval.194 Landowners can prevent all harvesters from entering 
the intertidal zone, and take trespass actions against harvesters who 
enter their intertidal zone to harvest Rockweed.195 Or, landowners 
who may be unaware of their rights, can, in effect, allow the harvest 
of Rockweed in their intertidal zone, by failing to take action against 
the harvesters. Further, the landowner can strike a deal with select 
                                            
subchapter II-A.”); see also Peter McGuire, Rockweed Industry Adrift After 
Ruling Allows Landowners to Restrict Access, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct. 
28, 2019, at 1 (“Spokesman Jeff Nichols said the Marine Resources 
commissioner still has regulatory power over rockweed, despite the court 
ruling”).  
191 See id. (finding that the right to regulate wildlife applies to wildlife on private 
land).  
192  McGuire, supra note 196. 
193 The opening of private areas for harvest will likely alter the amount of 
Rockweed harvested, and therefore the viability of the fishery. As a result, State 
knowledge of private licenses to harvest will be beneficial.  
194 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (holding “the state retains broad 
regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the 
integrity of its natural resources); see e.g., McCready v. Virginia,  94 U.S. 391, 5 
(1876) (acknowledging the state’s right to limit access to marine organisms). 
195 See ME. STAT. tit. 12 § 10657 (outlining the Maine civil trespass law). 
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harvesters, giving them a profit a prendre right to harvest 
Rockweed.196 
The public has lost another right to shoreline access in 
Maine. On its face, the decision distinguishes one public right: 
ability to harvest Rockweed. However, precedent set by the 
decision, may extinguish rights in the future. The Massachusetts 
Bay Ordinance only grants public trust rights to fish, fowl, and 
navigate the intertidal zone.197 But, many additional rights have 
been granted to the public because they are a natural derivative of 
the enumerated public trust rights.198 When public access is in 
question, courts are now less likely to find the right within the 
Massachusetts Bay Ordinance as a result of the decision. The 
privatization of the intertidal zone may expand because of the 
privatization of Rockweed.  
 
VII. BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR MARINE RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 
 
The privatization of one more resource of the intertidal zone 
in Maine has implications for marine resource management that 
extend far beyond the issue of seaweed. First, the privatization 
decision takes a clearly narrow view of the state’s Public Trust 
Doctrine. By deciding not to extend the doctrine to a broad 
interpretation of the public’s interest in the intertidal, the Court 
highlighted the Public Trust Doctrine’s limits as a tool of extending 
the state’s interests in managing resources for sustainability. Of 
course, in this particular case, many advocates for environmental 
conservation were actually on the side of property owners, but the 
implication is that private property interests are to be given more 
weight than the interests of public’s trust when put in conflict. For 
upcoming legal cases on climate change mitigation and adaptation, 
                                            
196 Profits a prendre and Licenses Distinguished, supra note 173 (defining profit 
a prendre rights in light of landowners and easement holders).  
197 Bell, 510 A. 2d at 509. 
198 Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E. 2d 561, 566 (1974); see e.g. McGarvey, 28 
A. 3d at 622 (expanding public access to the intertidal zone for scuba diving 
under the public trust doctrine).  
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a narrower Public Trust Doctrine may make it harder for States to 
prepare for the impacts of climate change in coastal zones.199 
Secondly, while the Court’s decision in Ross v. Acadian 
Seaplants Ltd. rests on a clear legal foundation the decision lacks a 
scientific foundation. The Court’s treatment of Rockweed as a 
terrestrial plant fails to consider taxonomic, phylogenetic, 
biological, or ecological data. Scientifically, Rockweed is not a 
plant. As increasingly complex scientific questions face courts 
adjudicating environmental disputes about sustainability, the 
Court’s decision demonstrates the disconnect that may occur 
between a matter of law, and a matter of science. Here, the Court 
made the best of the legal arguments encompassing the science, but 
failed to accurately consider the best available science. By deciding 
the legal question at issue through a relatively simple legal analogy 
rather than through an examination of extensive scientific literature 
that demonstrates that Rockweed is not in fact a plant, the Court 
made clear that the Court will determine whether an organism is a 
plant or an animal based on legal representation of what the 
organism is, as opposed to careful consideration of scientific 
evidence. 
The literature on common-pool resource management 
suggests that complete privatization of a common pool resource 
would not ensure that the most vulnerable resources would be 
protected.200 Yet, without privatization, there is no incentive for a 
private owner to invest because they cannot exclude others from 
benefitting from their investment. The best solution for sustainable 
                                            
199 For example, the debate over public access to the shoreline has resurfaced in 
Rhode Island after a citizen was arrested for harvesting seaweed from the shore 
see Brian Amaral, Seaweed Collector’s arrest in Rhode Island revives age old 
debate on Beach access: Massachusetts laws date to Mayflower Days, 
Providence Journal, June 15, 2009, 
https://www.southcoasttodau.com/news/20190615/seaweed-collectors-arrest-in-
rhode-island-revives-age-old-debate-on-beach-access-massachusetts-laws-date-
to-mayflower-days (“He is considering challenging not just his arrest but the 
way that coastal rights are enforced in Rhode Island at a time when beach 
erosion, climate change and the increasingly aggressive tactics of private 
landowners, like hiring private security guards, are chipping away at Rhode 
Islanders’ rights to access the beach.”) 
200 Elinor Ostrom, The Challenge of Common-Pool Resources, 
50 ENVIRONMENT: SCIENCE AND POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 8 
(2008).  
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regulation may be somewhere in between.201 The Court waded 
meaningfully into the discussions about effective management of 
the commons in the face of over-exploitation. The Court’s decision 
provides a legal interpretation that looks expansively on private 
property rights and regards public access rights as being more 
narrowly and explicitly defined. In general, governance approaches 
that seek to privatize common pool fisheries in order to ensure 
sustainability of the resource are managed by state agencies and 
assign private rights to fishers for the use of the resource. As 
increasing numbers of marine resource managers adopt the usage of 
individual transferable fishing quotas that privatize quantitative 
fishery access,202 and territorial use rights for fisheries (TURFs) that 
privatize fisheries spatially, one effect of the Court’s decision was 
to allocate all fishery rights to coastal landowners. In this case, the 
private goods are unlikely to be used by the newfound property right 
holders, whose interests are largely in preventing use of the 
intertidal resources all together. While this may allay fears of over-
exploitation for some, most privatization schemes are also directly 
and heavily managed by marine resource management agencies. 
Unusually, the Court, in making this decision for an already-
established commercial fishery that treated Rockweed as a common 
pool resource with state management, has removed much of the 
authority of the relevant management agency. Without a 
management framework, it is hard to maximize the sustainable use 
of a resource while preventing overuse. 
 What makes this an intriguing case is that coastal Maine is 
one of the most extensively studied locations for community based 
common pool resource management.203 Maine’s lobster fishery is 
managed through a co-management system in which social norms 
and preservation of a group’s reputation are said to motivate them 
                                            
201 Barbara A. Vestal, Dueling with Boat Oars, Dragging Through Mooring 
Lines: Time for More Formal Resolution of Use Conflicts in States' Coastal 
Waters?, 4 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 9 (1999). 
202 Seth Macinko, Public or private: United States commercial fisheries 
management and the public trust doctrine, reciprocal challenges, 33 NAT. 
RESOURCES J 919, 921(1993); Courtney Carothers & Catherine Chambers. 
Fisheries privatization and the remaking of fishery systems, 3 ENVIRONMENT 
AND SOCIETY 41 (2012). 
203 JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988). 
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to comply.204 This kind of regulation is more effective when the 
groups depend on the resource.205 Though the Court had no legal 
mandate to seek effective resource management as a primary goal, 
by effectively limiting the users of the resource (the harvesters) from 
the management of the resource (through the state agency), the 
Court’s decision goes against our best empirical understanding of 




 The much-awaited Court decision settled as a matter of law 
the rights to seaweed in Maine. It remains to be seen whether 
institutional mechanisms will be developed for granting harvesting 
companies private access rights for harvesting in the state or if the 
larger harvesters decide to leave the state of Maine and focus on 
Canadian and European Rockweed fisheries. Much of the trajectory 
of Maine’s Rockweed management post-decision will rest on what 
private parties decide to do, but also on whether the Maine 
Department of Marine Resources decides to continue to develop 
regulatory approaches to managing Rockweed as a fishery, despite 
its newfound legal status as private property. A salient question is 
whether a community-based management system will emerge.  
 However, regardless of the trajectory of Maine’s Rockweed 
management, the wrangling over public coastal access rights, the 
limits of intertidal navigation rights in Maine and Massachusetts, 
and the State’s interests in managing resources for sustainability are 
just beginning. In 2019, several Maine state legislators introduced a 
bill that would make all intertidal lands state property—and in doing 
so, align Maine with other states—thus effectively assigning the full 
bundle of rights in the intertidal zone to the public and legislating a 
stronger state Public Trust Doctrine.207 The bill did not pass, but 
                                            
204 Id at 8-9 (“[A] management scheme developed and accepted by the user 
group may enhance compliance.”). 
205 Pammela Quinn Saunders, A Sea Change Off the Coast of Maine: Common 
Pool Resources As Cultural Property, 60 EMORY L.J. 1323, 1349 (2011). 
206 Elinor Ostrom and Michael Cox., Moving beyond panaceas: a multi-tiered 
diagnostic approach for social-ecological analysis, 37 ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSERVATION 1 (2010). 
207 An Act to Revise the Laws Regarding The Public Trust in Intertidal Lands. 
129th Maine Legislature. LD 1323 2019. 
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indicates clearly that the disputes over the area where the land meets 
the sea are not likely to disappear. Fundamentally, the question of 
new technologies and products emerging in coastal and oceanic 
spaces, and whether the Courts see the possibility of a robust 
framework of rights held in public trust, will contribute to whether 
these new technologies are transformative and serve public, private 
and community-interests, or if the privatization of resources 
continues to expand into the water. 
 
